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A Measure to compare Matchings in
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Florian M. Biermann
The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Department of Economics
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Abstract
In matching markets the number of blocking pairs is often used as a criterion
to compare matchings. We argue that this criterion is lacking an economic
interpretation:

In many circumstances it will neither reect the expected

extent of partner changes, nor will it capture the satisfaction of the players
with the matching. As an alternative, we set up two principles which single
out a particularly disruptive subcollection of blocking pairs. We propose to
take the cardinality of that subset as a measure to compare matchings. This
cardinality has an economic interpretation: The subset is a justied objection
against the given matching according to a bargaining set characterization of
the set of stable matchings.

We prove multiple properties relevant for a

workable measure of comparison.
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1. Introduction
While almost all matching theory only distinguishes between stable and
unstable matchings, sometimes it is necessary to compare multiple unstable
matchings.
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For example, an experimental economist who simulates a matching market
in the classroom or in a computer laboratory may nd that some of the experiments conducted did not result in stable matchings. In order to interpret
the results, a comparison could be made regarding how close they are to
stability. This problem was encountered in Niederle and Roth (2007), and
the authors solved it by taking the number of blocking pairs as a criterion to
compare dierent matchings.
A related problem occured in Roth and Xing (1997), where the matchings
resulting from a simulation were not generally stable, yet had to be compared with each other. In a similar manner, the number of blocking agents,
i.e. those players who are part of at least one blocking pair, was taken as a
1,2
criterion of comparison.
Another necessity for the comparison of unstable matchings emerges when
the matchmaker is not trying to achieve stability, but instead pursues a different goal. If the objective does not single out a unique matching, then one
must be selected from those which fulll the primary requirement. Typically,
such a situation occurs when the matchmaker primarily wants to maximize
the number of matched pairs, i.e. wants to nd a

maximal

matching. This is

a reasonable objective for numerous markets in which the social benet or the
matchmaker's prot hinges on the number of matched players, while stability
is deemed not so important. Biró et al. (2010) describe many such situations
and mention the related literature.

One of their examples is an organ ex-

change market, where the maximality of the matching is the primary goal:
The size of the matching determines the number of transplantations, which
have the potential to be life saving. Moreover, blocking pairs existing in the
nal matching will not cause further reshuing as the agents will usually not
undergo additional operations just to resolve blocking pairs. Yet the

satis-

1 See in particular pp. 318-320 in their article.
2 Roth and Xing (1997) analyze the entry-level labor market for clinical psychologists,
which they do not model as a marriage market, but as a many-to-one matching market. It
is well known that many results derived for marriage markets carry over to many-to-one
matching problems (cf. Roth and Sotomayor (1990), chapter 5). Notably, the problems
associated with counting blocking pairs, which motivate this paper, exist in the same way in
many-to-one models. Therefore the reasoning presented here for marriage markets applies
in the same way to many-to-one models, and the measure of instability advocated here can
be naturally adapted to a many-to-one framework. For the conceptual purposes of this
paper it is unnecessary to cope with the considerably higher complexity of many-to-one
models.
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faction

the players obtain from the nal matching is of utmost importance:

Centralized matching regimes which are not accepted by the agents usually
get undermined.

3

The more agents are not satised with the matchmaker's

performance, the higher is the risk that the reputation of the centralized system will deteriorate, causing players to search for partners in decentralized
ways.
Other applications mentioned in said article are school placement, assigning students to university projects, a certain bipartite matching problem of
the US Navy, and even the optimal pairing of players in chess tournaments.
For these situations, in which stability is not the most important concern,
Hamada et al. (2009) and Biró et al. (2010) develop algorithms which create
maximal matchings with the least number of blocking pairs.

4

Finally, there are situations in which stability cannot be achieved for exogenous reasons, and in the absence of a stable matching the matchmaker has
to rank dierent unstable outcomes. For example, Khuller et al. (1994) develop an online matching algorithm for a situation in which all women are
in the market from the start, while the men enter sequentially. As soon as
a man has entered the market, the algorithm must match him to a woman
immediately. No assignments once made can be undone on later stages. Obviously, no algorithm can guarantee that the outcome is stable. Thus Khuller
et al. (1994) design their algorithm so as to minimize the expected number
of blocking pairs for the resulting matching.

5

Indeed, counting blocking pairs and taking their number as a criterion to
compare matchings makes a lot of sense at rst sight.

6

A blocking pair is

3 Undermining occurs for example through the phenomenon called unraveling
(cf. Niederle and Roth (2003)).

Also, the history of the NIMP algorithm provides evi-

dence that acceptance by the participants is essential for the survival of a matching regime
(cf. Roth (1984)).

4 The paper by Hamada et al. (2009) builds on Biró et al. (2010). The latter was already

published preliminarily as a conference proceeding and as a working paper in 2008.

5 Real-world matching markets in which stability is

practically unattainable are preva-

lent. Uncontrolled inux and outux of market participants, as modeled by Khuller et al.
(1994), can frequently be observed. In other (decentralized) markets, information decits
may be the main factor for the absence of stable matchings (cf. Eriksson and Häggström
(2008)).

6 Without changing the concept qualitatively, one may also divide the number of block-

ing pairs which exist for a matching by the number of all possible pairs, as advocated by
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a source of dissatisfaction on the part of its members. Therefore a matchmaker might lose customers and prots if too many players eventually nd
themselves in blocking pairs. Moreover, one might consider the number of
blocking pairs as a proxy for the amount of partner changes imminent at a
given state of the market. This interpretation also corresponds in a direct
way with the term measure of instability, which is used occasionally in the
literature.
Despite the supercial reasonability of counting blocking pairs, we think that
the concept is problematic. Often there is no connection between the satisfaction of the players with a certain matching and the number of blocking

µ be a
B(µ) is

pairs. Consider the following example: let
the collection of blocking pairs for

µ.

If

ing pairs cannot be satised simultaneously.
given player

m∈M

(or

w ∈ W)

7

is member of

matching and let

B(µ)

be

no matching, these block-

In the most extreme case, a

all

pairs in

B(µ).

Of these

blocking pairs, only one can be resolved. It seems questionable whether such
blocking pairs would generate the same level of dissatisfaction as an equal
number of blocking pairs which actually could be satised simultaneously.
In the outlined situation, there may be
form blocking pairs with

m,

n

{w1 , . . . , wn } who
knows that m, if he

dierent women

but each of these women

could decide which of the blocking pairs was to be satised, would marry

w := maxm {w1 , . . . , wn }.

So if the dissatisfaction with the matching is

based on rational considerations, essentially only one woman and one man
would be discontent with the matching

µ,

namely

w

and

m.8

If the set of blocking pairs whose cardinality is counted was a matching, a

Eriksson and Häggström (2008). This procedure is only necessary, however, if one wants
to compare matchings from dierent markets. If the matchings to be compared are within
the same market, as will be assumed throughout this paper, one does not lose anything
by taking the absolute number of blocking pairs.

7 In this paper a matching is dened as a collection of pairs such that none of them

share a player, see denition 2 on page 7. This denition was used before (for example in
Blum and Rothblum (2002)) and it is equivalent with the standard function denition in
Roth and Sotomayor (1990).

8 Our point may be further illustrated by the following example: A single super model

forms blocking pairs with thousands of men in a population. But do these blocking pairs
cause discomfort among rational men?

We do not believe so.

A rational man knows

that the supermodel will by all likelihood not consider him to be the most attractive
partner among those with whom she forms blocking pairs. The blocking pair in which he
participates is rather fantasy than a real option.

4
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feature of the concept we propose, this problem would entirely disappear.
Then the pairs contained in that set could be satised in parallel, and all of
these blocking pairs would be forgone opportunities to improve the outcomes
of the participating players. These improvements could have materialized by
these players if they would not have participated in the centralized matching
mechanism, causing justied dissatisfaction with the matchmaker.
Yet it is equally problematic to take the number of blocking pairs as a measure of the degree of instability of a matching.

Again,

n

blocking pairs

which have a player in common cannot be satised simultaneously, hence
only one of the

n

pairs could actually trigger a partner change. For this rea-

son, the instability of matchings which have a high number of hypothetical
blocking pairs (blocking pairs which share players with other blocking pairs)
could be overstated by this measure. At the same time, one can construct
examples in which even one single blocking pair may trigger o a vacancy
chain changing the assignments of

all

players in the market. The instability

of a matching with few but highly disruptive blocking pairs can be drastically
understated by the traditional measure. The connection between the degree
of instability of a matching and its number of blocking pairs is very lose at
best.

9

This paper oers an alternative measure for comparing matchings. We believe that certain subsets of the blocking pairs have a particular signicance,
both regarding their disruptive potential as well as in terms of player satisfaction. We call them

permissible sets

of blocking pairs for a matching. It

will be shown in proposition 2 on page 12 that all permissible sets of blocking
pairs for a matching have the same cardinality. So their cardinality can be
used as a measure to compare matchings. A matching which has a higher
value according to this measure is expected to show more reshuing as well
as higher dissatisfaction among the players.
Moreover, we claim that a permissible set of blocking pairs constitutes not
only a

possible transformation of the market, but also a likely

transformation

9 In a model with undisclosed preferences which get disclosed upon random encounters
of the players, the total amount of blocking pairs would be an indicator for the expected
readjustments within a certain time span or in a given amount of stages. This would be
an interesting model, but it would go beyond the setting discussed here. Here we keep to
the assumption that the existence of a blocking pair is known to the players who form it,
as it is standard in most of matching theory.

5
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D(µ) is a permissible set of blocking pairs for
a matching µ, then our claim is based on the fact that D(µ) can be interpreted as a justied objection against µ according to a bargaining set which

among shortsighted players. If

has the appealing property that it coincides with the set of stable matchings.
So if one believes in the empirical relevance of bargaining set concepts and
Gale-Shapley stability, one can conjecture that the blocking pairs which get

µ comprise a permissible set. 10
Unfortunately, even if the set D(µ) of blocking pairs to be counted comprises
a justied objection against µ, its size is just an indicator for the rst-order
satised at an unstable matching

dynamics emerging from the given matching.

The concept proposed here

says nothing about further market transformations which could take place
after the counted blocking pairs were resolved.

11

Therefore the use of the

concept presented here as a measure of instability is limited.

Yet it im-

proves on the simple counting of blocking pairs, which cannot even predict
the rst transformation of the market and does not allow for inference on the
nth -order dynamics either. Furthermore, the limitation may not be so severe
if divorces are costly, as it is the case in many practical applications. The
more unattractive partner changes become, the more important becomes the
rst transformation of the market, while multistage dynamics will be shorter
and less likely to occur. The example of an organ exchange market, in which
people refrain from undergoing further surgeries in order to resolve blocking
pairs, was already mentioned.
At the core of the approach introduced here is the selection of a matching
to be formed from the set

B(µ)

of blocking pairs for a matching

µ.

This

is not trivial, as usually many matchings can be formed from the elements
in

B(µ).

We oer a rule for this selection. It will be stated and formalized

in Section 3, and the resulting

permissible sets

of blocking pairs will be

interpreted economically in Section 4. Furthermore, these sets will be shown
to have interesting and useful features in Sections 5, 7, and 8.

The most

important of these features is the fact that all permissible sets of blocking
pairs have the same cardinality for a given matching, so that this cardinality
constitutes a well-dened measure of comparison.

Section 6 shows

how

to

10 More on empirical support for bargaining sets can be found in footnote 18 on page 11.
11 The issue of nth -order dynamics emerging from a matching is briey discussed in
Appendix

B on page 26.
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nd the permissible sets of blocking pairs for a given matching.

Section

9 illuminates a connection between the measure put forward here and the
total number of blocking pairs used previously. The paper is concluded with
th
Section 10. In the Appendix B we look at n -order dynamics which can be
derived from the concept of permissible sets.

2. Preliminaries
Denition 1 (Marriage Market). A marriage market is a triplet
(M, W,  ), where M and W are disjoint nite sets and  is a set which
contains for each m ∈ M a linear order m dened over the set {m} ∪ W .12
In the same way,  contains for each w ∈ W a linear order w dened over
the set {w} ∪ M .
We refer to
order

w,

m



as a

preference prole.

is dened, stands for

m's

over which the preference order

x ∈ M ∪ W , the
a x b ⇔ a x b ∧ a 6= b.

being single. For
the rule

The item

m,

over which the preference

option of being single. Likewise the item

w

is dened, stands for

strict

13

order

x

w's

option of

is derived from

x

by

As in Blum and Rothblum (2002), we dene a matching to be a set of
pairs, which is equivalent to the usual function denition of matchings:

Denition 2 (Matching). A matching in the marriage market (M, W,  )
is a set µ ⊆ M × W such that if (m̂, ŵ), (m̄, w̄) ∈ µ, then ŵ = w̄ if and only
if m̂ = m̄.
(m, w) ∈ µ, then we say that m
is single under matching µ. Correspondingly, if for w ∈ W there exists no
m ∈ M with (m, w) ∈ µ, then we say that w is single under matching µ.
To ease notation, for a pair (m, w) ∈ µ we will write µ(m) to denote m's
partner under µ, i.e. µ(m) := w . In this case, we will also write µ(w) to
denote w 's partner under µ, i.e. µ(w) := m. If there is no pair in µ of which
a player x ∈ M ∪ W is a member, then we denote by µ(x) the player x
himself, i.e. µ(x) := x.

If for

m∈M

there exists no

w∈W

with

12 Linearity of an order means that it fullls antisymmetry, transitivity, and totality.
Due to antisymmetry, a linear order does not allow for ties between unequal elements: For

z, y ∈ {m} ∪ W

with

z 6= y

either holds

z m y

or

y m z ,

but not both.

13 An order is strict if it fullls irreexivity, asymmetry, and transitivity.

7

Published by Berkeley Electronic Press Services, 2011

7

Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Working Papers, Art. 592 [2011]

Denition 3 (Blocking pair). Let µ be a matching. A pair (m, w) ∈ M ×
W with m w µ(w) and w m µ(m) is a blocking pair for the matching µ.
The set of blocking pairs which exist for a matching

µ

is denoted by

B(µ).

Denition 4 (Individual Rationality). A matching µ is individually rational if for every player x ∈ M ∪ W holds µ(x) x x.
Denition 5 (Stability, Gale and Shapley (1962)). A matching µ is stable if it is individually rational and no blocking pairs exist for µ.
The following notation will be used throughout the paper: For
we denote by
pair in

U,

p(U ) ⊆ M ∪ W

U ⊆ M ×W

the set of those players who are member of a

formally

p(U ) = {x ∈ M ∪ W | ∃y ∈ M ∪ W : (x, y) ∈ U ∨ (y, x) ∈ U }.

3. Permissible collections of blocking pairs
We denote by

D(µ) ⊆ B(µ)

that set of blocking pairs whose cardinal-

ity we propose to take as a measure of comparison.

As mentioned in the

D(µ) := B(µ). D(µ) can only be
µ if D(µ) is a matching, i.e. D(µ) is

introduction, other authors usually set

a

possible deviation from the matching

a

collection of such blocking pairs which can get satised simultaneously. This
requirement is stated as:

Principle 1. The set D(µ) is a matching.
Of course there are many subsets of

B(µ)

which are matchings, so Principle

1 alone does not give an answer which blocking pairs should be counted. Our
proposal for solving this problem makes use of the concept of domination,
brought forward in Klijn and Massó (2003):

Denition 6. Let (m̂, ŵ), (m, w) ∈ M × W . Then (m̂, ŵ) dominates (m, w)
if one of the following two conditions is fullled: 1) m̂ = m and ŵ m w or
2) ŵ = w and m̂ w m.
(m, w) ∈ M ×W , denote by dom((m, w)) ⊆ M ×W the set of pairs which
(m, w). Note that the irreexivity of the relations m and
w ensures (m, w) ∈
/ dom((m, w)), ∀(m, w) ∈ M × W . The following simple

For

are dominated by

lemma on domination is used later:

8
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Lemma 1. Let (m, w) and (m̂, ŵ) be two dierent blocking pairs in M × W .
If m = m̂ or w = ŵ, then exactly one of the following statements is true:
1.
2.

(m, w) ∈ dom((m̂, ŵ))
(m̂, ŵ) ∈ dom((m, w)).

The proof of this lemma is provided in the appendix (page 24). Using domination, we state

Principle 2. If (m, w) ∈ B(µ)\D(µ), then (m, w) ∈ dom((m̂, ŵ)) for some
(m̂, ŵ) in D(µ).
(m, w) will not be counted only if another blocking
pair (m̂, ŵ) which dominates (m, w) will be counted. From an economic
viewpoint, the formation of (m̂, ŵ) prevails over the formation of (m, w),
because (m̂, ŵ) and (m, w) share a member who prefers his or her partner in
(m̂, ŵ) and thus would refrain from entering (m, w).14
Verbally, a blocking pair

A set of blocking pairs which fullls the Principles 1 and 2 is referred to as

permissible.

In Section 7 will be shown that a permissible set of blocking

pairs for a matching

µ

is empty if and only if

µ

is a stable matching.

4. The economic basis of permissible sets of blocking pairs
In this section, we provide an economic motivation for the permissible sets
of blocking pairs dened above. Klijn and Massó (2003) adapt the bargaining
set of Zhou (1994) to marriage markets and prove that it coincides with the
set of

weakly stable 15

matchings.

16

Here we will take a dierent direction:

We will try to nd an economically reasonable denition of a bargaining set

14 For another economic interpretation of

domination, drawing on the farsightedness of

the players, see Klijn and Massó (2003) p. 94.

15 If all blocking pairs for a matching are dominated by other blocking pairs, then a

matching is called weakly stable. Klijn and Massó (2003) show by example that the set
of weakly stable matchings may be a superset of the set of stable matchings, i.e. there are

µ is not stable,
(m, w) ∈ dom((m̄, w̄)).

marriage markets in which a matching
pair

(m̄, w̄) ∈ B(µ)

with

but for any

(m, w) ∈ B(µ)

exists a

16 The Zhou bargaining set is obtained from the bargaining set of Mas-Colell (1989)

by replacing a weak inequality by a strict inequality in the denition of the objection
and imposing further restrictions on the counterobjection.

Both bargaining sets have

interesting mathematical properties, a discussion of whom can be found in Peleg and
Sudhölter (2007).

9
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for marriage markets which coincides with the set of

stable

matchings. Why

do we need such a bargaining set?
Our goal is to interpret permissible sets as justied objections of the participating players against the given matching. Because the cardinality of the
permissible sets is our measure of matching comparison, it should be

0

if a

matching is stable. This is an indispensable condition for the claim that our
measure indicates the degree of instability of a matching in some sense. On

are blocking pairs for a matching, it is unstable, and
thus our measure should not assume the value 0. In this case, there should be
the other hand, if there

a nonempty permissible set and thus a nonempty justied objection against
that matching. For these reasons we are looking for a bargaining set with
two properties:
1. There should be no justied objection against a matching if and only
if it is stable.
2. The justied objections against a matching should be the permissible
sets.
Obviously, the bargaining set of Zhou (1994) and its adaptation by Klijn and
Massó (2003) does not fulll our demands: There can be unstable matchings
which are weakly stable, and which are therefore in the bargaining set of
Klijn and Massó (2003). So according to their concept, there exist no justied objections against these unstable matchings. In contrast, the following
denition of a bargaining set has the desired features:

Denition 7 (Objection). An
ing S 6= ∅, S ⊆ B(µ).

objection

against a matching µ is a match-

Denition 8 (Counterobjection). A counterobjection against an objection S is a matching T 6= ∅, T ⊆ B(µ), T * S , such that for any pair
(m, w) ∈ T and any pair (m̂, ŵ) ∈ S holds (m, w) ∈
/ dom((m̂, ŵ)).
As it is known from other bargaining set concepts, an objection for which no
counterobjection exists is called

justied.

S ⊆ B(µ) against a matching µ is a matching formed
µ. A counterobjection T ⊆ B(µ) is a matching which
is also formed from blocking pairs for µ and it consists only of pairs which are

In short, an objection

from blocking pairs for

not dominated by pairs of the objection. This is economically reasonable: If
a pair

(m, w) ∈ T was

dominated by a pair in

S,

then either

m

or

w

would

10
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strictly prefer to keep to the objection and the counterobjection could not
form. If, on the other hand, all pairs in

S

and hence

T

T

were

have no arguments against the formation of
participating in
ticipating in

T

not

dominated by pairs in

was a valid counterobjection, then the supporters of

T

T.

T

over

would

They would not nd a player

whom they could convince to stay in

would weakly prefer

S

S

 all players par-

S.

In accordance with economic intuition, the condition

T * S

rules out the

possibility that an objection can be countered by itself or by a subset of
itself, because in such a situation the counterobjection would yield exactly
the same payo as the objection to all of its participants.

17

µ if
µ is stable is provided in Section 7. The following result validates
the interpretation of a permissible set D(µ) as a justied objection of a group
of players against the matching µ.
The proof that there exists no justied objection against a matching

and only if

Proposition 1. D(µ) is a permissible set of blocking pairs if and only if it
is a justied objection against µ.
The proof, which has no aesthetic value, is given in the appendix on page 25.
In view of the preceding proposition, it becomes clear that our measure is the
cardinality of groups of players who can come together to improve their outcome independently of the other players. In this way, they form an objection
against a matching.

But among such coalitions, only those are considered

which cannot be blocked by counterobjections. If one accepts that in general
bargaining concepts have real world signicance, it makes sense to attribute
a strong potential to reshue a matching market to those coalitions which
are justied objections.

18

Moreover, as this bargaining set coincides with the

set of stable matchings, the conjecture that its justied objections play a

17 Remind that

S

and

T

are collections of pairs, not players. As the utility of a player is

solely determined by the pair of which he or she is a member, no player in
a gain from forming a counterobjection

18 Section

T

against

S

if

T

would have

T ⊆ S.

11 of Maschler (1992) reviews empirical evidence for and against bargaining set

concepts and discusses its validity. The data on which Maschler bases his analysis was both
generated in laboratory experiments (pp. 638-641) and obtained from real world situations
(pp. 641-642). In 1992 the empirical foundation of bargaining sets was controversial but
encouraging. Maschler himself assumes a rather critical standpoint, while authors he cites,
notably Kahan and Rapoport (1984), are very positive about the empirical importance of
bargaining sets.

11
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signicant role in real world marriage markets is indirectly supported by the
undoubted empirical relevance of Gale-Shapley stability.
Furthermore, dissatisfaction will particularly prevail among players who nd
themselves in a justied objection (and not just in a blocking pair).

If a

player realizes that he or she is member of a justied objection against a
matching, it does not only mean that an improvement for himself or herself
was left out by the matchmaker. Aggravating would be the fact that without
counterobjections, the improvement would be practically attainable through
decentralized negotiations between the players.
Finally, Ehlers (2007) adapted Von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets to marriage markets. A set of matchings is a von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set
if it is

internally stable

and

externally stable

(for details see Ehlers (2007)).

Without proof, we note that the permissible sets of blocking pairs for a
matching

µ

comprise an internally stable set of matchings.

5. A workable measure to compare matchings
To evaluate the next result correctly, it is important to remind that by
denition,

any

matching which is a subset of

B(µ)

is an objection. More-

over, even if for some reason all objections were formed by the same set of
players, from the above denition does not follow that the counterobjections
are formed by the same set of players: If a counterobjection
objection

S

contains a pair which is an element of

S,

T

against an

it can be included in

T or left out without changing the fact that T is a counterobjection against
S . Considering these facts, it is somewhat surprising that every justied objection against a given matching µ is formed by the same set of players, as
will be shown next.

Proposition 2. Let S and T be justied objections against an individually
rational matching µ. Then p(S) = p(T ).19
Proof. S

and

T

µS := S
m̄ ∈ M with

are matchings, so for notational consistency we set

and µT := T . Without loss of generality, assume there is a player
m̄ ∈ p(S)\p(T ). We will now derive a contradiction from this assumption.
First of all, if µS (m̄) ∈ p(S)\p(T ), then there is no pair in T which shares
a member with (m̄, µS (m̄)). Consequently, there is no pair (m̂, ŵ) ∈ T with

19 For the notation

p(U ),

see page 8.
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(m̄, µS (m̄)) ∈ dom((m̂, ŵ)) and so (m̄, µS (m̄)) is a counterobjection against
T , contradicting our assumption that T is a justied objection. So it must
hold µS (m̄) ∈ p(T ).
Set K := { x ∈ M ∪ W | µS (x) 6= µT (x) }, i.e. K is the set of players who
do not have the same partners under µS and µT . Note that m̄ ∈ K . Now we
employ a graph-theoretic argument. Construct a graph G = (K, E) whose
vertices are the elements in the set K . Let there be an edge in E between
m ∈ K and w ∈ K if (m, w) ∈ µS ∪ µT .20 In this graph, players in K who
are single neither under matching µS nor under matching µT are members of
two dierent pairs in µS ∪ µT , hence they have a degree of 2. Players in K
who are single under exactly one of both matchings are member of exactly

µS ∪ µT , hence they have a degree of 1. (Remind that players who
µS and µT and players who have the same partners
under both matchings are not members of K , hence they are not vertices
of the graph G .) Because all vertices in G have degree of either 1 or 2, all
21
connected components of the graph G must be circuits or simple chains.
If a component of G is a circuit, all vertices in that component have degree 2.
From m̄ ∈
/ p(T ) follows that m̄ has a degree of 1, so the connected component
of which m̄ is a node must be a simple chain. The proof will be completed
22
by showing that this simple chain cannot be a component of the graph G .
By contradiction, assume v1 , . . . , vn to be the simple chain of of players startone pair in

are singles under both

20 This graph is similar to the so called bi-choice graph introduced by Klaus and Klijn
(2010).

Like the bi-choice (di)graph, which helps its inventors to prove and reprove a

couple of results on roommate problems in Klaus and Klijn (2010) and Klaus et al. (2009),
the graph dened here connects a player

x∈K

with the partners

x has under two dierent

matchings (in Klaus et al. (forthcoming) the bi-choice graph is not used anymore).

21 A simple chain in a graph is a sequence of

between each

vi

additional edge

distinct vertices v1 , . . . , vn with an edge
vi+1 for 1 ≤ i ≤ n − 1. A circuit is a simple chain v1 , . . . , vn with an
between v1 and vn , and all edges which are part of the circuit are distinct

and

(cf. Roberts and Tesman (2009), p. 135).

22 For the proof, one could also use the bi-choice (di-)graph of Klaus and Klijn (2010).

Therefore one would rst have to show that in the bi-choice digraph of the matchings
and

µT ,

no two players point at each other. This is a requirement needed for Lemma

Klaus et al. (2009) to hold. Afterwards, from their Lemma

1

µS
1 of

follows that there are only

cycles and loops in the bi-choice graph, implying that there is no simple chain.
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m̄

ing with

v1 = m̄).

(i.e.

From

(v1 , v2 ) ∈ µS

∀ 1≤j ≤n−1:
j
j
If we walk along the simple chain

is odd
is even

follows inductively:

⇒ (vj , vj+1 ) ∈ µS ,
⇒ (vj+1 , vj ) ∈ µT .

v1 , . . . , v n ,

(1)

we recognize another rule:

∀ 1≤j≤n:
j
j

is odd
is even

⇒ µS (vj ) vj µT (vj ),
⇒ µT (vj ) vj µS (vj ).

This is shown by induction: Obviously, (2) holds for

because

m

is single

µS . As µS is an individually rational matching, m
µS over being single under matching µT . By contradiction, assume (2) would not be true for all j , and let 1 ≤ j ≤ n be the lowest
integer such that (2) is not fullled. Furthermore, assume j to be odd (for
an even j , the argument is symmetrical). Then for vj must hold µS (vj ) ≺vj
µT (vj ), while according to (2) for vj−1 holds µT (vj−1 ) vj−1 µS (vj−1 ). From
(1) follows (vj , vj−1 ) ∈ µT ⊆ B(µ), and both vj and vj−1 prefer each other
over their partners under µS . Because in K are only players who have dierent partners under µS and µT , it is ensured that (vj , vj−1 ) ∈
/ µS . Although
(vj , vj−1 ) ∈ B(µ)\µS , there is no pair in µS which dominates (vj , vj−1 ), contradicting our assumption that µS was a justied objection against µ. This
under

µT

v1 ,

(2)

but not under

prefers his partner under

proves the correctness of (2).
Now consider player
is single under
chain).

µS

vn :

If

vn

is odd, then by (1)

dicting (2). In the same way, if
she is single under

µT

G

vn

µT

implies

is even, then

µS

implies

µS (vn ) vn µT (vn ),

If follows that there can be no component of the

which is a simple chain starting with

there exists no player

µT (vn ) vn µS (vn ), contraby (1) (vn−1 , vn ) ∈ µS , while

(otherwise she would not be the last element of the

So individual rationality of

again contradicting (2).
graph

while he

(otherwise he would not be the last element of the simple

So individual rationality of

simple chain).

(vn , vn−1 ) ∈ µT ,

m̄ ∈ p(S)\p(T ), implying that

m̄ ∈ p(S)\p(T ). 

Herewith it is proved that for a matching

µ,

all sets

D(µ)

have the same

cardinality. So this number is well-dened and can be used as a measure of
comparison.
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6. Finding all permissible sets of blocking pairs for a given matching µ
Only if at least one permissible set of blocking pairs for a matching

µ

is

identied, its elements can be counted. For a concept with practical aspirations, it is therefore essential to show how to

nd a permissible set of blocking

µ.

Beyond that, further analysis of

pairs for an arbitrary unstable matching

the concept may make it necessary not only to identify one permissible set,
but to nd all of them.

Fortunately, there is a simple way to achieve this

goal.

µ be an individually rational matching in the
x ∈ M ∪ W we denote by Bµ (x) ⊆ M ∪ W the set

Let

market

(M, W,  ).

For

Bµ (x) := {y ∈ M ∪ W | (x, y) ∨ (y, x) ∈ B(µ)},
i.e. the set of all players with whom

x

forms a blocking pair for

Further-

x ∈ M ∪ W we consider a preference order
which is dened
23
˜
domain as x . x has the following properties:

more, for any
on the same

µ.

˜x


˜ x y ⇔ z x y
z, y ∈ Bµ (x) : z 

(3)

˜ x z.
z∈
/ Bµ (x) ⇔ x 

(4)

and

Those comparisons not determined by the above rules must be chosen arbitrarily subject to transitivity and antisymmetry of the resulting order. Given

(M, W,  ) and an individually rational matching µ in this market, a
˜ x with the above two properties exists for any x ∈ M ∪ W .
preference order 
This can be seen as follows: Clearly, the preferences x for x ∈ M ∪ W
already fulll (3). In two steps we can manipulate x to make it compatible
with (4). At rst, we rank the single option x directly below the element
minx Bµ (x) and denote the resulting preference order by 0x . Afterwards,
we assign to any element y ∈
/ Bµ (x) with y 0x x an arbitrary rank below x
a market

(avoiding ties). The resulting preference order fullls (3) and (4). Furthermore, it is transitive, total, and antisymmetric, because in our manipulation
we did not introduce ties into

˜ x.


˜x


and so the linearity of

x

carries over to

We need the following lemma:

23 As before, the relation

˜x


is derived from

˜x


by the rule

˜ x b ∧ a 6= b.
˜ x b ⇔ a
a

15
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Lemma 2. Let µ be a matching in a market (M, W,  ) and let (m, w) ∈
M × W be an individually rational pair 24 with (m, w) ∈
/ µ. If there is no
(m̂, ŵ) ∈ µ with (m, w) ∈ dom(m̂, ŵ), then (m, w) is a blocking pair for µ.
The proof is stated in the appendix on page 25.

µ be an unstable but individually rational matching in the market
˜ be a preference prole which is constructed according
(M, W,  ), and let 
to the conditions (3) and (4) based on the sets Bµ (x) for all x ∈ M ∪ W .
Now let

With these denitions, we can state:

Proposition 3. A set D ⊆ B(µ) is a permissible set of blocking pairs for
the unstable but individually rational matching µ in the market
˜ .
(M, W,  ) if and only if D is a stable matching in the market (M, W, 
)
Proof.

˜ .
(M, W, 
)

x ∈ M ∪ W,
˜x

are those with whom x forms a blocking pair for µ. So from the fact that µ̃
˜ follows µ̃ ⊆ B(µ).25 Moreover,
is individually rational under preferences 
˜w w
µ̃ 6= ∅, because B(µ) 6= ∅ and for any pair (m, w) ∈ B(µ) holds m 
˜
and w m m by condition (4) above. So if µ̃ was the empty matching, then
˜,
a pair (m, w) ∈ B(µ) would be a blocking pair for µ̃ under preferences 
˜
conicting with µ̃'s stability in the market (M, W, 
). With µ̃ ⊆ B(µ) and
µ̃ 6= ∅ we have established that the matching µ̃ is an objection against µ in
the market (M, W,  ). Next will be shown that µ̃ is justied. Assume by
contradiction there would be a counterobjection T against µ̃. Then because
T * µ̃, there exists a pair (m, w) ∈ T, (m, w) ∈
/ µ̃, such that for no pair
(m̄, w̄) ∈ µ̃ holds (m, w) ∈ dom((m̄, w̄)). From (m, w) ∈ T ⊆ B(µ) follows
that (m, w) is an individually rational pair in the original market (M, W,  ),
thus Lemma 2 ensures that (m, w) is a blocking pair for µ̃ in (M, W,  ).
Form a stable matching

µ̃

in the market

For

the players preferred over the single option according to the preferences

Hence it holds

m w µ̃(w)
24 This means that both

m and w
Theorem 1).

say that

w m m

and

and

w m µ̃(m).

m w w

(5)

are fullled. Klaus et al. (2009) would

are not matched in an individually irrational way (see the proof of their

25 As before, the set

B(µ)

is the set of blocking pairs for

µ

in the market

(M, W,  ).
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µ̃ is
˜
w ≺m µ̃(m).
But as

stable in

˜ ,
(M, W, 
)

it must hold that either

˜ w µ̃(w)
m ≺

or

W.l.o.g. assume

˜ w µ̃(w).
m≺

(6)

˜ w w by (4). Therefore
(m, w) ∈ B(µ) follows m ∈ Bµ (w) and thus m 
(6) implies µ̃(w) 6= w, henceforth (µ̃(w), w) ∈ µ̃. With µ̃ ⊆ B(µ) we conclude
(µ̃(w), w) ∈ B(µ) and thus also µ̃(w) ∈ Bµ (w).
We have shown that m, µ̃(w) ∈ Bµ (w). But if this is true, from condition (3)
and the rst part of (5) follows
From

˜ w µ̃(w).
m

(7)

Clearly, (6) and (7) contradict each other. Herewith it is shown that every
stable matching in the market

˜ is a permissible set of blocking pairs
(M, W, 
)

(M, W,  ).
D be a permissible set of blocking pairs for µ in
the market (M, W,  ). For notational convenience set µD := D . µD ⊆ B(µ)
and so for any pair (m, w) ∈ µD holds w ∈ Bµ (m) and m ∈ Bµ (w). There˜ m m and m 
˜ w w, which means that µD is
fore condition (4) ensures w 
˜ . Now assume by
an individually rational matching in the market (M, W, 
)
contradiction that there exists a blocking pair (m̄, w̄) for µD in the mar˜ . Then [m̄ 
˜ w̄ w̄ ∧ w̄ 
˜ m̄ m̄], so
˜ w̄ µD (w̄) 
˜ m̄ µD (m̄) 
ket (M, W, 
)
by (4) follows [m̄ ∈ Bµ (w̄) ∧ w̄ ∈ Bµ (m̄)]. It follows (m̄, w̄) ∈ B(µ) by
the denitions of the sets Bµ (w̄) and Bµ (m̄). As µD is a permissible set
of blocking pairs for µ in the market (M, W,  ) and (m̄, w̄) ∈ B(µ), there
must be a pair (m̂, ŵ) ∈ µD with (m̄, w̄) ∈ dom((m̂, ŵ)), and it holds either
[m̄ = m̂ ∧ ŵ m̄ w̄] or [w̄ = ŵ ∧ m̂ w̄ m̄]. If [m̄ = m̂ ∧ ŵ m̄ w̄] is
true, then ŵ ∈ Bµ (m̄) because (m̄, ŵ) ∈ µD ⊆ Bµ . But if w̄, ŵ ∈ Bµ (m̄),
˜ m̄ w̄ which means that
from µD (m̄) = ŵ m̄ w̄ and (3) follows µD (m̄) = ŵ 
˜ , contrary to our
(m̄, w̄) is no blocking pair for µD in the market (M, W, 
)
assumption. If [w̄ = ŵ ∧ m̂ w̄ m̄] is true, the argument is symmetrical. 

for

µ

in the market

In the other direction, let

As a consequence, in order to nd all permissible sets of blocking pairs for
a matching
to

µ

µ,

we just have to construct a preference prole

˜


with regard

˜ .
)
(M, W, 
for µ in the

and then compute the set of stable matchings in the market

Each of these matchings is a permissible set of blocking pairs

17
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market

(M, W,  ).26

An algorithm which can be applied to nd the set of

stable matchings in the market

˜ was devised by Irving and Leather
(M, W, 
)

(1986). If we are only interested in the cardinality of the permissible sets,
of course it is sucient to compute just one stable matching in the market

˜
(M, W, 
)

with the algorithm of Gale and Shapley (1962).

We remark that Proposition 2 on page 12 could also be proved by making
use of the well known result stated as Corollary 3 on page 20 together with
Proposition 3 above. If all permissible sets of blocking pairs for a matching
in a market

˜
(M, W, 
)

(M, W,  )

µ

are in fact stable matchings in a manipulated market

(Proposition 3), then the fact that the set of those players who

are not single is the same at every stable matching in a market (Corollary
3) implies that all permissible sets of blocking pairs must be formed from
the same set of players. However, by proving Proposition 2 independently
of Corollary 3, it becomes clear that Proposition 2 directly follows from the
Principles

1

and

2,

through which permissible sets are dened, and does not

depend on a hidden argument from the set of stable matchings.

7. A permissible set of blocking pairs for a matching µ is empty if
and only if µ is stable
Now we come to the question under which condition nonemptiness of a
permissible set is guaranteed. A permissible set
set if and only if

µ

D(µ) ⊆ B(µ)

is stable. Hence, according to proposition 1 there is no

justied objection against a matching if and only if

µ

is an empty

µ is stable.

In particular,

being a

weakly stable

matching (Klijn and Massó (2003)) is not sucient

D(µ)

to be empty.

This is an important result, as it proves that the

for

bargaining set presented in section 4 indeed coincides with the set of stable
matchings.

Corollary 1 (to Proposition 3). There is no justied objection against an
individually rational matching µ if and only if µ is stable.27
26 Our result reveals an isomorphism between the permissible sets of blocking pairs for a
matching

µ

and the set of stable matchings in another marriage market. Similarly, Ehlers

(2007) makes use of the result of Blair (1984) in order to show that there is an isomorphism
between a Von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set in one marriage market and the set of
stable matchings in another market (see Ehlers (2007), Remark

2,

p. 544).

27 Remind that by denition an objection is nonempty. Thus empty justied objections

do not exist.
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Proof.  ⇐:

If

µ

is stable, then there are no blocking pairs and thus there

˜ be a marriage
(M, W, 
)
market where
was constructed with regard to µ. In the rst part of the
˜ is
proof of Proposition 3 was shown that any stable matching in (M, W, 
)
a nonempty permissible set of blocking pairs for µ, i.e. a justied objection
against µ. 
is no objection.

 ⇒:

If

µ

is unstable, then let

˜


Corollary 2 (to Corollary 1). If there exists an objection against a matching µ, then there exists a justied objection against µ.
Proof.

If there exists an objection

a blocking pair for

µ.

Thus

µ

S

against

µ,

then any pair

(m, w) ∈ S

is

is unstable. Hence, Corollary 1 ensures that

there exists a justied objection against

µ. 

8. Permissible sets of blocking pairs and the set of stable matchings
µ in a mar˜
riage market (M, W,  ) we can construct another marriage market (M, W, 
)
˜ are the permissible sets of blocksuch that the stable matchings in (M, W, 
)
ing pairs for µ. Can we reverse the direction of this argument? If we have an
arbitrary market (M, W,  ), can we always nd a matching µ such that the
set of stable matchings of (M, W,  ) are the permissible sets of blocking pairs
for µ? In this section that question is answered armatively. Surprisingly,
the stable matchings in an arbitrary market (M, W,  ) are the permissible
Proposition 3 showed that for an arbitrary unstable matching

sets of blocking pairs for the
players are single) of

empty matching

(the matching in which all

(M, W,  ):

Proposition 4. Let µ be the empty matching in the market (M, W,  ). A
matching µ0 is stable in (M, W,  ) if and only if it is a permissible set of
blocking pairs for the matching µ.
Proof.

µ0

(M, W,  ). Let (m, w) be a
blocking pair for the empty matching such that (m, w) is not an element of
µ0 . To establish that µ0 is a permissible set of blocking pairs for µ, it must be
0
shown that (m, w) is dominated by a pair in µ . (m, w) cannot be a blocking
0
0
pair for µ due to the stability of µ . So because of the strict preferences,
0
0
it must hold µ (m) m w or µ (w) w m (or both), as otherwise (m, w)
0
0
0
would block µ . But then (m, w) is dominated either by (m, µ (m)) ∈ µ or
0
0
by (µ (w), w) ∈ µ . In the other direction, assume D is a permissible set of
First assume

is a stable matching in

19
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D is a matching in (M, W,  ) (with all players
who are not part of a pair in D being singles), and D is individually rational
28
because D ⊆ B(µ).
It needs to be shown that there exist no blocking pairs
for the matching D . A blocking pair (m, w) for D cannot be dominated by
any pair in D because then either m or w would prefer their partners under
D over the formation of (m, w) and so (m, w) would be no blocking pair. But
if (m, w) is not dominated by any pair in D , then it is a counterobjection
against D . By Proposition 1 D is a justied objection against µ, and thus
there exist no counterobjections against D . This establishes that there are
no blocking pairs for D . 
blocking pairs for

µ.

Then

Using Propositions 4 and 2, a well known result of matching theory can
be proved again:

Corollary 3. Let µ, µ0 be stable matchings in a market (M, W,  ). Then a
player x ∈ M ∪ W who is not single at the matching µ is also not single at
the matching µ0 .
Proof. By Proposition 4 both µ and µ0 are permissible sets of blocking pairs
for the empty matching in the market

(M, W,  ),

and thus justied objec0
tions against that matching. So from Proposition 2 follows p(µ) = p(µ ). 
This result was proved in two dierent ways for marriage markets in
McVitie and Wilson (1970) (theorem on page 298) and Gale and Sotomayor
(1985) (Proposition

1).

It was proved in Roth (1984) (Theorem

9)

for the

generalization of many-to-one matching problems.

9. Comparing the cardinalities of the sets D(µ) and B(µ)
The following example demonstrates that the new measure can be reversed to the measures of instability frequently used in previous works, namely
the numbers of blocking pairs.

Example:

Consider a market with

M = {m1 , m2 , m3 }
28 Under the empty matching
blocking pair

D ⊆ B(µ)

(m, w)

for

µ

holds

follows the individual

and

W = {w1 , w2 , w3 , w4 , w5 }

µ, all players are singles. So for the members of any
m w µ(w) = w and w m µ(m) = m. Hence from
rationality of D .
20
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and the following preferences:

P (w1 ) =
P (w2 ) =
P (w3 ) =
P (w4 ) =
P (w5 ) =

m1
m1
m1
m2
m3

w1
w2
w3
w4
w5

29

P (m1 ) = w1 m1 w2 m1 w3 m1 m1
P (m2 ) = w4 m2 m2
P (m3 ) = w5 m3 m3

w1
w2
w3
w4
w5

Compare two matchings

µ1 , µ2

in this market, dened by

µ1 = {(m2 , w4 ), (m3 , w5 )},
µ2 = {(m1 , w1 )}.
B(µ1 ) = {(m1 , w1 ), (m1 , w2 ), (m1 , w3 )} and B(µ2 ) = {(m2 , w4 ), (m3 , w5 )}.
As |B(µ1 )| = 3 > 2 = |B(µ2 )|, the matching µ1 would be considered less
stable than µ2 by the traditional measure. In constrast, we have D(µ1 ) =
{(m1 , w1 )} and D(µ2 ) = {(m2 , w4 ), (m3 , w5 )}. So |D(µ1 )| = 1 < 2 = |D(µ2 )|.
By the measure proposed here, matching µ2 would be less stable than µ1 .

Then

So the new measure and the number of blocking pairs can be reversed to
each other. But to what extent can they be reversed? It would be at odds
0
with intuition if one could nd two matchings µ and µ in the same market
0
0
with B(µ) ⊆ B(µ ) and |D(µ)| > |D(µ )|. In that case a manipulation
of the matching
a

reduction

µ

which would

add

B(µ) could lead to
µ0 existed, one could

blocking pairs to

of the measure. If such matchings

µ

and

hardly claim that the cardinality of a permissible set is a reasonable estimate
for the degree of instability of a matching. Fortunately, this possibility can
be ruled out:

Proposition 5. Let µ and µ0 be individually rational matchings with B(µ) ⊆
B(µ0 ). Then |D(µ)| ≤ |D(µ0 )|.
Proof. An injective function which maps D(µ) into D(µ0 ) will be constructed.
Such a function only exists if

|D(µ)| ≤ |D(µ0 )|.

For

x ∈ D(µ),

29 The preferences are only stated down to the single option.

let

y(x) :=

Partners who are less

preferred than the single option are irrelevant because both matchings in the example are
individually rational.
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(m, w)

be an arbitrary element in
0
function f : D(µ) −→ D(µ ) by


f (x) =

x
y(x)

D(µ0 )
if

with

x ∈ dom((m, w)).

Dene a

x ∈ D(µ) ∩ D(µ0 ),

otherwise.

f (x) exists and that it is an injection. f (x)
0
exists because any element x ∈ D(µ) which is not in D(µ ) must be dominated
0
by an element in D(µ ) (Principle 2). So y(x) exists for each x ∈ D(µ),
x∈
/ D(µ0 ). Furthermore, for any x ∈
/ D(µ)∩D(µ0 ) holds y(x) ∈
/ D(µ)∩D(µ0 ).
This follows from principle 1: y(x) is a pair which dominates x, which means
that x and y(x) must have a player in common. But as D(µ) is a matching
(principle 1), no two pairs in the set D(µ) share a player.
0
0
Hence, the set D(µ)\D(µ ) is mapped into D(µ )\D(µ). Consequently, f is
0
an injection on the domain D(µ) ∩ D(µ ).
0
Now assume there would be two pairs x, z ∈ D(µ)\D(µ ) with y(x) = y(z) :=
(m, w). Note that one pair in D(µ0 ) cannot dominate two pairs in D(µ) via
m, because then m would be a member of both these dominated pairs. But
D(µ) is a matching, and there are no two pairs which share a player. ( m
can be replaced by w in this argument.) Therefore x is dominated by (m, w)
via m and z is dominated by (m, w) via w (or vice versa). But if this is
the case, m and w prefer the pair (m, w) over the pairs x and z , whence the
pair (m, w) is a blocking pair in B(µ). So (m, w), which is not member of
D(µ), must be dominated by a pair in D(µ) (Principle 2). But m and w
prefer (m, w) over x and z , implying (m, w) can neither be dominated by x
nor by z . Hence, (m, w) is not dominated by any pair in D(µ), contradicting
Principle 2. This rules out y(x) = y(z). It follows that f is also an injection
0
on the domain D(µ)\D(µ ). 

It will be shown that the function

10. Conclusion
A measure to compare matchings is needed in situations in which GaleShapley stability is not a feasible or appropriate objective. Such situations
can emerge in experimental economics, when the matchmaker pursues goals
other than stability, or when particular market circumstances prevent the
matchmaker from generating a stable matching.

The number of blocking

pairs or closely related criteria were deployed in previous papers (Khuller
et al. (1994), Roth and Xing (1997), Niederle and Roth (2007), Hamada
et al. (2009), Biró et al. (2010)), and even some general properties on these
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measures of instability were derived in Eriksson and Häggström (2008).
Here we argued that instead of counting all blocking pairs which exist for a
matching, one should rather count a set of blocking pairs which comprises
a possible and economically reasonable transformation of the market. This
approach led to two principles for the set of blocking pairs to be counted:
The rst made sure that this set was really a matching, which means that it
must not contain two or more pairs sharing a common member. The second
principle was based on economic intuition. It stated that any blocking pair

(m, w) for a matching µ was counted, unless one counted another blocking
pair (m̄, w̄) for µ which dominated (m, w). The economic argument behind
this principle is that the sole reason a blocking pair would not get satised
should be the existence of another, dominating blocking pair which
satised.
called

does

get

Those sets of blocking pairs which fullled both principles were

permissible.

It was then shown that we can characterize the set of stable matchings as a
bargaining set, and that according to this bargaining set the permissible sets
of blocking pairs are justied objections of groups of players against the given
matching. Furthermore, even if multiple dierent permissible sets of blocking
pairs exist for a matching, they all have the same cardinality. This property
makes the cardinality of permissible sets a practicable measure of matching
comparison. Next, a method was presented to identify all permissible sets of
blocking pairs existing for a matching. Then we established that there is no
unstable matching which has an empty permissible set of blocking pairs, and
no stable matching which has a non-empty permissible set of blocking pairs.
Finally, an example illustrated that for two matchings in the same market,
the measure brought forward in this paper can be conversed to the absolute
and relative numbers of blocking pairs.
In this theoretical work, one important question remained unanswered: Does
the cardinality of a permissible set of blocking pairs

empirically

capture the

extent of partner changes inherent in an unstable matching?
In order to substantiate such a claim, one could conduct a laboratory experiment and check whether the

rst

blocking pairs which get satised at a

given unstable matching are suciently often permissible sets. Yet even if
the relevance of permissible sets could be empirically supported, their cardinality would just predict the extent of the

rst stage

30 See Appendix B for a rudimentary analysis of the

of the dynamic.

nth -order

30

dynamics.
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Divorce cost may prevent excessive partner changes and cause dynamics to be
short. Therefore we argued that the costlier divorces are, the more adequate
it is to measure the degree of instability by the size of permissible sets.
However, in real world matching markets, the average number of players'
partner changes may be easier observable than divorce costs (which are not
necessarily monetary).

31

The lower the average number of partner changes is,

the higher tends to be the share of the market readjustment occuring at the
beginning of the dynamic, and the more relevant is the size of the permissible
sets. Consequently, real world markets with low average numbers of partner
changes would be the rst candidates for applying the measure introduced
in this article.

Appendix A. Proofs left out in the main body
Lemma 1 (of page 9). Let (m, w) and (m̂, ŵ) be two dierent blocking
pairs in B(µ). If m = m̂ or w = ŵ, then exactly one of the following
statements is true:
1.
2.

(m, w) ∈ dom((m̂, ŵ))
(m̂, ŵ) ∈ dom((m, w)).

Proof.

Only the case

m = m̂

is considered, as the case

w = ŵ

can be

treated analogously. First we prove that at least one of the two cases holds.

(m, w) ∈
/ dom((m̂, ŵ)). Then m = m̂ implies ŵ m w, and thus the
strict preferences demand w m ŵ , which means (m̂, ŵ) ∈ dom((m, w)). By
the same argument, (m̂, ŵ) ∈
/ dom((m, w)) implies (m, w) ∈ dom((m̂, ŵ)).
Now we prove that (m, w) ∈ dom((m̂, ŵ)) and (m̂, ŵ) ∈ dom((m, w)) cannot
be true at the same time. Assume (m, w) ∈ dom((m̂, ŵ)). The denition of
(m, w) ∈ dom((m̂, ŵ)) requires that either holds 1) [ m = m̂ and ŵ m w]
or 2) [w = ŵ and m̂ w m]. From m = m̂ follows w 6= ŵ because of
(m, w) 6= (m̂, ŵ), and so not both cases can be fullled simultaneously. Thus
only case 1) holds true. m = m̂ and (m̂, ŵ) ∈ dom((m, w)) would imply
w m ŵ, a contradiction. Hence it follows (m̂, ŵ) ∈
/ dom((m, w)). 

Assume

31 For

real marriage markets (formed by men and women who want to marry), data about

the number of partner changes, divorce rates, and players' search eorts were acquired by
sociologists. Frey and Eichenberger (1996) highlight economically interesting facts from
this literature.
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Proposition 1 (of page 11). D(µ) is a permissible set of blocking pairs
if and only if it is a justied objection against µ.
Proof.

D(µ) is a justied objection against µ. Then
D(µ) is a matching (i.e. fullls Principle 1) and
D(µ) ⊆ B(µ). It needs to be shown that D(µ) also satises Principle 2.
By contradiction, if D(µ) would not satisfy Principle 2, there would be a
pair (m, w) ∈ B(µ)\D(µ) for which exists no pair (m̂, ŵ) ∈ D(µ) with
(m, w) ∈ dom((m̂, ŵ)). But if (m, w) ∈
/ dom((m̂, ŵ)) for any (m̂, ŵ) ∈ D(µ),
the pair (m, w) ts the denition of a counterobjection, generating a contradiction. Hence D(µ) must also fulll Principle 2, whence it follows that
D(µ) is a permissible set of blocking pairs. In the other direction, assume
D(µ) is a permissible set of blocking pairs but there is a counterobjection
T ⊆ B(µ) against D(µ). From this we construct a contradiction as follows: Pick a pair (m, w) ∈ T , (m, w) ∈
/ D(µ). Such a pair must exist since
T * D(µ) is ensured by the denition of a counterobjection. Also by the
denition of a counterobjection, no pair (m̂, ŵ) ∈ D(µ) dominates (m, w).
But as (m, w) ∈ B(µ)\D(µ), Principle 2 demands that there is a pair in
D(µ) which dominates (m, w), delivering the contradiction. 
Assume that the set

denition 7 ensures that

Lemma 2 (of page 16). Let µ be a matching in a market (M, W,  ) and let
(m, w) ∈ M ×W be an individually rational pair 32 with (m, w) ∈
/ µ. If there is
no (m̂, ŵ) ∈ µ with (m, w) ∈ dom(m̂, ŵ), then (m, w) is a blocking pair for µ.
Proof.
M ×W

Assume by contradiction that an individually rational pair

with

(m, w) ∈
/µ

(m, w) ∈
µ, nor

would neither be dominated by any pair in

µ. As (m, w) is no blocking pair, it must
µ(m) m w or µ(w) w m, implying µ(m) 6= m or µ(w) 6= w because
(m, w) is an individually rational pair. For any x ∈ M ∪ W and any matching µ holds µ(x) 6= x ⇒ (x, µ(x)) ∈ µ ∨ (µ(x), x) ∈ µ. Hence at least one
of the pairs (m, µ(m)), (µ(w), w) is an element of µ. As a consequence, it
holds (m, w) ∈ dom((m, µ(m))) or (m, w) ∈ dom((µ(w), w)), contradicting
the assumption that (m, w) was not dominated by any pair in µ. 
would it be be a blocking pair for

hold

32 This means that both

w m m

and

m w w

are fullled.
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Appendix B. nth -Order Dynamics
Iteratively identifying permissible sets and satisfying their blocking pairs
leads to a dynamic of matching transformations. It will be shown that the
dynamic does not necessarily converge to a stable matching. Therefore the
size of a permissible set

D(µ)

cannot be interpreted as a distance from the

set of stable matchings in a direct sense, i.e. as the length of a sequence
which transforms

µ

into a stable matching. Besides this fact, extending the

analysis to multiple stages of matching transformation yields no insights relevant for the measure discussed in the preceding sections. This is the reason
why we refer to this topic in the appendix.
nth -order dynamics will be just touched here without comprehensive analysis.

Nevertheless, the example presented in this section gives rise to some

questions which might inspire future research.
Let

µ.

µ

be a matching and

A new matching

σ(µ)

D(µ)

be a permissible set of blocking pairs for

can be dened by

σ(µ) := D(µ) ∪ {(m, w) ∈ µ | m, w ∈
/ p(D(µ))}
with p(D(µ)) being set of players who are not singles under the matching
D(µ) (see the denition on page 8). Verbally, the matching σ(µ) contains the
permissible set D(µ) and those pairs of µ which do not share a player with
any pair in D(µ). The denition of σ(µ) implies that a player x who does
not participate in the permissible set D(µ), but whose partner µ(x) does, is
33
single under σ(µ).
Using the transformation σ , one can think about a sei
i
i−1
quence of matchings (µ )i=0,...,∞ such that µ = σ(µ
) for some permissible
i−1
set D(µ
).
By Corollary 1 (page 18), if the sequence

(µi )i=1,...,∞

converges, then it

must converge to a stable matching. Unfortunately, it may happen that the
sequence cycles, and even worse, there may not even be a way out of the
cycle through choosing a dierent permissible set of blocking pairs at some

33 For satisfying arbitrary single blocking pairs (not permissible sets), this natural way to
transform a matching was formalized in Blum and Rothblum (2002), p. 432. Furthermore,
the matching transformation dened here is a special case of the enforceability notion
dened by Klaus et al. (forthcoming) for roommate problems, where only coalitions are
considered in which all players improve their outcome.

26

http://services.bepress.com/feem/paper592

26

Biermann: A Measure to Compare Matchings in Marriage Markets

point. This fact is illustrated by the upcoming example. To understand the
example correctly, the following (trivial) result is useful:

Lemma 3. Let µ be a matching. If B(µ) is a matching, then there exists a
unique permissible set of blocking pairs for µ.
Proof.

B(µ) share a player,
hence no pair in B(µ) is dominated by any other pair in B(µ). Therefore
by principle 2 all pairs in B(µ) must be in D(µ), i.e. B(µ) ⊆ D(µ). By
denition holds D(µ) ⊆ B(µ) (cf. page 8), thus for all permissible sets D(µ)
for µ must hold B(µ) = D(µ), whence D(µ) is a unique set. 
If

B(µ)

Example:

is a matching, then no two pairs in

Consider a market with

M = {m1 , m2 , m3 }
and the following preferences:

and

W = {w1 , w2 , w3 }

34

P (w1 ) = m3 w1 m1 w1 w1
P (w2 ) = m2 w2 m3 w2 w2
P (w3 ) = m1 w3 m2 w3 w3

The cycle starts with the matching

P (m1 ) = w1 m1 w3 m1 m1
P (m2 ) = w3 m2 w2 m2 m2
P (m3 ) = w2 m3 w1 m3 m3

µ0

in this market, dened by

µ0 = {(m1 , w1 ), (m2 , w2 )}.
B(µ0 ) = {(m3 , w1 ), (m2 , w3 )} (the set of blocking pairs for µ0 ). Be0
0
0
0
cause B(µ ) is a matching, lemma 3 ensures D(µ ) = B(µ ) and D(µ ) is
unique. By the transformation σ we obtain

Then

µ1 = {(m3 , w1 ), (m2 , w3 )}.
B(µ1 ) = {(m1 , w3 ), (m3 , w2 )}
D(µ ) = B(µ1 ). Hence

Again
1

is a matching, so by lemma 3 follows

µ2 = {(m1 , w3 ), (m3 , w2 )}.
34 As before, the preferences are only stated down to the single option.
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Again

B(µ2 ) = {(m1 , w1 ), (m2 , w2 )}

is a matching, so

B(µ2 ) = D(µ2 ).

Therefore

µ3 = {(m1 , w1 ), (m2 , w2 )}
and

µ0 = µ3 .

At each step of the transformation,
ised simultaneously.

all

existing blocking pairs were sat-

So the example demonstrates that stability cannot

always be reached if one satises more than one blocking pair at each matching. This is an interesting fact, given a sequence which leads to stability if
one chooses just one blocking pair at a matching

always

exists (Roth and

Vande Vate (1990)). How do those matchings which can be reached through
0
0
any of the sequences starting at µ depend on µ ? If one could prove nice
properties of the sequences dened in this section, and empirical support
could be delivered, they might be promising candidates for a genuine model
of matching market microdynamics.
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